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The present paper tries to explain why the current international financial legal regime has taken
the shape it has, particularly as it regards to the use of soft-law norms and institutional-making
in the apex of the regime: the coordination level of the relevant actors by the Group of Twenty’s
Financial Stability Board (FSB). Accordingly, it will be argued that path-dependency and the
national financial regulators’ zealously held powers are two main factors that explain the current
informal, “softness” of the FSB—its lack of international legal personality and legally binding
instruments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A key characteristic of international financial law is the lack of
binding rules: Almost every aspect of the field has been created
through “non-binding” standards that states, banks and financial
institutions can implement on a voluntary basis through so-called
“soft-law”.
This regime was put to the test in the recent 2007-2008
financial crisis, and was found to be wanting, particularly in its ability
to coordinate all relevant actors. While there were many causes for the
crisis, it is clear that the financial institutions and their national
regulators played a key role in triggering it. 1 Therefore, there appears
to be a post-crisis consensus that financial institutions cannot only be
regulated through market forces,2 but rather that governmental
oversight is needed—as the failures and successes of countries in

1 See Joseph Stiglitz, The Anatomy of a Murder: Who Killed the American
Economy?, in WHAT CAUSED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 139, 141–42 (Jeffrey Friedman
ed., 2011) (recognizing that although there are many actors and institutions
responsible for the crisis, “blame should be centrally placed on the Banks (and the
financial sector more broadly) and the investors,” because the former created the risk
they were supposed to manage by “engag[ing] in excessive leverage” and the latter
didn’t understand the risk involved); but cf. Richard Posner, Afterword: The Causes of the
Financial Crisis, in WHAT CAUSED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, Id. at 279 (“there were two
main causes [for the crisis]: unsound monetary financial intermediation [and
inadequate banking regulation]”).
2 See José Fernández, Global Politics, 5 MEXICAN LAW REVIEW 333, 363–64
(2013) (arguing that the 2008 financial crisis ended the neoliberal free-market model,
thereby posing a global economic challenge difficult to overcome: “finding an
economic model to go beyond statism (Welfare state), and mercantilism (liberalism)”)
(emphasis in the original).
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weathering past crises attest3—and more coordination between parties
through regulation at the international level.4
In the aftermath of the crisis, a new entity was created to
address the lack of coordination: the Financial Stability Board (FSB).
Established in April of 2009 by the Group of Twenty (G-20)—an
informal forum for central banks’ governors and financial ministers of
nineteen economies and the European Union to discuss global
economic issues—the FSB has assumed the function of coordinating
all the regulatory and supervisory actions done at the international
level.5 As a successor of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), which in
turn was created by the Group of Seven (G-7)—akin to the G-20, the
G–7 is a political forum for the most industrialized economies—the
FSB “has assumed a key role in promoting the reform of international
financial regulation.”6 However, unlike other creations in the
international financial legal regime, the FSB was not endowed with any

3 See, e.g., Karen Sigmond, Banking Regulation in Mexico: Lessons from Financial
Crisis, 4 MEXICAN LAW REVIEW 3, 31 (2011) (praising the creation of the CNBV in
Mexico during its 1995 crisis—the governmental entity entrusted with supervising
the whole financial system—and asking whether this could be made at the
international level); see also Geoffrey Miller, Is Deposit Insurance Inevitable? — Lessons
from Argentina, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: COMPARATIVE
AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 392, 398–401 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Alan O. Sykes
eds., 1997) (arguing that one effect of the Mexican 1995 crisis was the bank runs and
burgeoning crisis that arose in Argentina during that year, which in turn led Argentina
to the creation of both a deposit insurance system and an entity that oversees its
functioning to counteract the crisis effectively; thus, despite the opposition of highranking officials in Argentina’s government to deposit insurance, that country
departed from its policy of controlling bank risk through only market discipline
because the political pressure of reinstating the deposit insurance system became
irresistible).
4 See Rosa Lastra, Do We Need a World Financial Organization?, 17 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 787, 805 (2014).
5 G20
2016 CHINA, About, (last visited May 1, 2016),
http://g20.org/English/aboutg20/AboutG20/201511/t20151127_1609.html;
Charter of the Financial Stability Board (June 19, 2012), art. 1, (last visited May 1,
2016), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/FSB-Charterwith-revised-Annex-FINAL.pdf.
6 FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, About: Our History, (last visited May 1,
2016), http://www.fsb.org/about/history/.
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real international legal personality,7 and therefore, its decisions are not
legally binding.8
In light of this “softness”, different proposals have emerged
that try to give more “teeth” to the international financial architecture,
particularly through “hardening” the existing norms into
internationally, legally binding ones, enforced through an international
organization.9 On the other side of the debate, there are calls to keep
soft-legal instruments and forums with greater flexibility, but
enhancing their effectiveness to accomplish what the pre-crisis regime
did not: more coordination of supervisory, standard-setting, and
enforcement authorities.10
Considering that debate helps establish a backdrop for the
present paper which will try to explain why the current international
financial legal regime has taken the shape it has, particularly as it
regards to the use of soft-law norms and institutional-creation in the
apex of the regime: the coordination level of the relevant actors in the
regime. Furthermore, it will be argued that path-dependency and the
powers zealously held by national financial regulators are two
7 Articles of Association of the Financial Stability Board (January 28,
2013), art. 1, (last visited May 1, 2016) http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wpcontent/uploads/r_130128aoa.pdf (“An association by the name of “Financial
Stability Board” . . . is hereby established pursuant to Article 60 of the Swiss Civil
Code.”).
8 Charter of the Financial Stability Board, supra note 5, art. 24 (“This
Charter is not intended to create any legal rights or obligations”); but cf. Suyash
Paliwal, The Binding Force of G-20 commitments, 40 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1 (2014)
(analyzing the bindingness of the commitments undertaken within the FSB as
unilateral declarations, custom, estoppel and reciprocity).
9 See Lastra, supra note 4, at 793 (“The IMF is the only institution (other
than the Bank for International Settlements and the World Trade Organization) that
has international legitimacy, an array of tools (surveillance, conditional financial
assistance, and technical assistance), appropriate financial resources, and staffing to
assume a formal role as global financial authority . . . . [O]nly the Fund can effectively
contribute to the enforcement of those standards through its surveillance function.”);
see also John Jackson, Global Economics and International Economic Law, 1 J. INT’L ECON.
L. 1, 22-23 (1998) (providing a laundry list of topics to address whenever designing
international institutions for the banking and financial sectors).
10 See Jan Wouters & Jed Odermatt, Comparing the ‘Four Pillars’ of Global
Economic Governance: A Critical Analysis of the Institutional Design of the FSB, IMF, World
Bank, and WTO, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 49 (2014).
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important factors that explain the current informal, “softness” of the
FSB.11 Through arguments that explore the unique and rapid
technological changes of the regime, the use of soft-law in international
financial law has been said to be preferred because of its flexibility and
expediency. However, on one hand, through these soft-law and
informal forums national regulators have been able to retain the power
they hold pursuant to their domestic legislative instruments, while on
the other, have found success in projecting these enhanced power and
enforcement capabilities on the international level. Contrary to what
would occur by ceding rule-making power to an international
organization—which allegedly would complicate the decision-making
process and diminish direct communication among national
regulators—the national regulators retain the ability to wield the rules
of the international financial game through soft-law standards that
conform to their points of view, and which countervail the need for
achieving consensus with more stakeholders12 that formal venues and
treaty-making would require.
Although not every national financial regulator is invited to the
game, this result is not necessarily negative, as the main priority and
value of the regime (financial stability) does not rely on the democratic
character of the rule-making process and institutions, but rather, on
the technocratic knowledge of its experts. But even when taking that
factor into account, the move from the “elite” membership of the FSF
to the FSB’s more democratic structure signals a positive step taken by
the controllers of the regime: the national financial regulators.
II. SOFTNESS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW
Many of the legal institutions and instruments underpinning
the international financial legal regime are neither treaty-based, nor
considered to be part of general international law. Conversely, they are
part of another subset of norms referred to as “soft–law” that are used
in the international financial legal world; particularly because of soft

See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The Political Economy of International Financial
Regulation, 88 IND. L.J. 1405 (2013).
12 Like their national diplomatic representatives or other foreign
regulators.
11
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law’s tendency for flexibility and effectiveness vis-à-vis their “harder”
siblings.
A. Distinction Between “Soft” and “Hard” International Law
Under a rule-based approach to public international law, 13
legally binding norms are only those reflected in Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice: international treaties,
custom, and general principles of international law;14 everything else is
legally irrelevant.15 Under this positivistic view, only rules created by
states are legally binding, and thus enforceable. 16
In contrast, different ways of regulating areas of international
relations have emerged on a transnational and global basis, thus leading
to the emergence of the so-called “soft-law” norms.17 The main
characteristic of these soft law norms is that they do not comply with
either of the requirements for “harder” norms: those being created by
states and conforming to one of the three primary sources of
international law. Therefore, they are not “legally” binding, but rather,
implemented on a voluntary basis without the ability to be legally
enforced or sanctioned at the international level.
Because soft-law does not require creation by states, it has
largely been international organizations, private entities, other nonstate actors, and even subsets of states’ governments creating them. 18

13 The main feature of this approach is the emphasis on the normative
aspect of public international law, conceptualizing the law as a system of rules
binding upon its subjects, which can be appreciated through an examination of the
three recognized normative sources of international law. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI,
THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 39–41 (2011).
14 Statute of the International Court of Justice (entered into force 24
October 1945) 1 UNTS 993, art. 38 (1).
15 JOSÉ ÁLVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS
48 (2005).
16 Id.
17 Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and
Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EJIL 1 (2006).
18 See Mauricio Del Toro, El Fenómeno del Soft Law y las Nuevas Perspectivas
del Derecho Internacional, 6 ANUARIO MEXICANO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL
[Mexican Yearbook of International Law] 513 (2006) (advocating for the
conceptualization of soft law as a continuum of normative force to analyze practically
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Thus, this flexibility makes these alternative bodies suitable for
whenever there is deadlock or lack of consensus for a multilateral
treaty, or a need to harmonize the rules at the international level.19
When technocratic experts create soft law, the legitimacy of
these rules rely on their consensual basis to attain the common goal of
their creators, as well as the technocratic expertise involved.20
The use of soft-law has mainly been attributed to two of its
main virtues: flexibility and effectiveness, both of which have been
praised for their help in achieving greater rates of compliance in certain
areas, such as capital adequacy.21 Whereas soft-law can be rapidly
created without the need to seek state consensus or state participation

how the international legal system works and norms are created by actors other than
states).
19 See e.g., Andrea Bjorklund, Assessing the effectiveness of soft law instruments in
international investment law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND SOFT LAW 51, 81
(Andrea Bjorklund & August Reinisch eds., 2012) (analyzing the forms of soft law
instruments and their usage for investment law, concluding that because of the
criticism to the regime and failed, past attempts to negotiate a multilateral instrument
without states’ participation—like the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development’s failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment—the “negotiation of a
multilateral instrument might be facilitated and influenced by a soft law instrument
that brings together investment law practice in an objective manner, that sets forth
areas of convergence and divergence and the choices that need to be made by
drafters, and that clearly sets out the policy implications of each of those choices”.
In other words, not a codification attempt, but rather “the distillation would more
likely take the form of a commentary, annotation or treatise, and would be directed
towards a wider audience than just States, though it could help to guide treaty
negotiators and decision-makers, including States and arbitrators”).
20 See Alejandro Rodiles, Coalitions of the Willing: Coyuntura, Contexto y
Propiedades. Un Primer Esbozo, 7 ANUARIO MEXICANO DE DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL [Mexican Yearbook of International Law] 675, 701-02 (explaining
that soft law norms compete with formal public international legal rules, as the
former do not claim legitimacy from their legal status, but rather from the political
consensus achieved by its participants—engaging in a normative process to regulate
a common right cause—and the technocratic nature of both the decision-process
and the standard created).
21 Bas Arts & Dieter Kerwer, Beyond legalization? How global standards work,
in LAW AND LEGALIZATON IN TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS 144, 160–62 (Christian
Brütsch & Dirk Lehmkuhl eds., 2007).
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at all, custom and principles require long periods of time and universal
consensus to emerge.
Likewise, whereas soft-law can be created by entities other than
states and does not require consensus by its creators or the ratification
of national legislatures to exist and be modified, treaties do require the
consensus of state entities or international organizations for their
creation, usually after a national legislature ratification process has
occurred, and can only be modified with the consensus of the involved
parties;22 all of which lengthens the creation and adaptation processes
and may hinder its effectiveness as a rule–making tool.23 When
informal forums, or what Vabulas and Snidal call “informal
international intergovernmental organizations,” (IIGOs) are preferred
over international organizations it is due to the following reasons:
States opt for less formality by using IIGOs when the
advantages of lower sovereignty and negotiation costs,
flexibility and speed outweigh the need for
enforcement commitment, consensus, and the
bureaucratic centralization.24
Accordingly, although soft-law lacks the status of harder law,
per se, “[it] is not necessarily inferior to legally binding obligations as a
See UNGA Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May
1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, arts. (2)(1)(a), 11, 39; see
also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International
Organizations or between International Organzations, arts. 2 (1)(a)(b), 11, 39.
23 Hanspeter Neuhold, Variations on the Theme of ‘Soft International Law’, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND FRAGMENTATION.
FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF GERHARD HAFNER 343, 344 (Isabelle Buffard et al.
eds., 2008); but cf. Nico Krisch, More equal than the rest? Hierarchy, equality and US
predominance in international law, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 135, 156–59 (Michael Byers & George
Nolte eds., 2003) (depicting the use of informal standard-setting—such as the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision—as a departure of the sovereign equality of
states, and thus as an opportunity for the United States to place itself above the law:
“the United States relies heavily on informal means of lawmaking and enforcement,
as this very informality allows it to disregard many of the constraints otherwise
imposed by sovereign equality.”).
24 Felicity Vabulas & Duncan Snidal, Organization without delegation: Informal
intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) and the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements, 8
REV. INT. ORG. 193, 219 (2013).
22
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means for solving problems in international relations [because, as
discussed previously] . . . it offers advantages, which in some cases may
outweigh its shortcomings [i.e., their lack of enforceability].”25 As
espoused by Chris Brummer, the use of soft law in international
financial regulation is bolstered by disciplining mechanisms that make
soft law more coercive: “reputational constraints inform the decision
making of regulators in the same way that reputation disciplines heads
of state who commit to international agreements”. 26
B. International Financial Architecture
The use of soft-law mechanisms can be seen throughout the
whole international financial regime. To illustrate this, the following
sections will analyze the three different levels or stages that comprise
the regime: standard-setting; supervision and coordination; and
enforcement and sanctioning.
1.

Standard-setting

International financial law has been regulated mainly through
soft-law norms, such as standards, which are implemented on a
voluntary basis by national financial regulators or financial institutions
and banks. Almost invariably, all members of the FSB27 have engaged
in international standard setting: states’ financial regulators;
international financial organizations;28 and other standard-setting
bodies that were conceived to standardize international finance and
that we could call standard-setting bodies strictu sensu.29

25
26

Neuhold, supra note 23, at 351.
Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works, 99 GEO. L.J. 257,

263 (2011).
See Charter of the Financial Stability Board, supra note 5, art. 5(1).
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development, and the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS).
29 Such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the
Committee on the Global Financial System, the Committee on Payments and Market
Infrastructures, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, the
International Accounting Standards Board, and the International Organization of
Securities Commissions.
27
28
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Perhaps the most effective production of soft-law, in terms of
compliance, has been BCBS’s work on standardizing the capital
adequacy of banks, which has been praised for the high number of
states that have implemented it (90 percent of all countries adhere to
Basel I’s capital requirement), and that effect has been attributed to the
BCBS’s departure from the rigidness of classic international law
making,30 in addition to its undisputed expertise in that area.31 An
additional example of highly valued soft-law is the Equator Principles
of the International Financial Corporation, a member of the World
Bank Group, which sets de facto standards for parties dealing with
project finance on a global scale by inciting financial institutions to
voluntarily adopt standards in order to implement normative and
business related rationales for the conduction of environmental and
social risk management.32 Likewise, this includes the
See Arts & Kerwer, supra note 21; see also Rodiles, supra note 20, at 693–
95 (defining the Basle Committee of 1975 as a “coalition of the willing”: defined as
a transnational network of actors that do not rely on the procedural or substantive
rules of public international law rule-making, but conversely engage into normative
creation processes through standards that depart from it and which are implemented
effectively because of the political consensus of its participants and the convenience
to accomplish a common goal).
31 See Arts & Kerwer, supra note 21 (“the Committee has a high reputation
of experts, no competition from other bodies that engage into standard-setting in
that area, and has effective third party enforcement mechanisms—national
authorities implement the law voluntarily or are obligated through loans from IMF
or other international lenders that require compliance with the standard”); but see the
critiques on Basel Rules’ role in the 2007–2008 financial crisis in Juliusz Jablecki &
Mateusz Machaj, A Regulated Meltdown: The Basel Rules and Banks’ Leverage”, in WHAT
CAUSED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 1, at 200, 226 (analyzing the negative role
that Basel’s rules had by diminishing the financial entities incentive to regulate
themselves: “Capital-adequacy rules based on fixed risk measurements—and
designed (paradoxically) to protect the economy from excessive credit expansion—
were used in unanticipated ways, hiding the risks from the sight of supervisors and
investors alike and giving everyone an utterly false sense of security, confidence, and
stability.”); see also Posner, supra note 1, at 288 (“the American amendment to Basel I
adopted in 2001, and Basel II, adopted in 2004, underestimated the riskiness of
mortgage-backed securities by assigning them a minimal risk weight, and so gave
banks a green light to buy more of these assets than turned out to be safe for the
economy as a whole.”).
32 See Christopher Wright, Setting standards for responsible banking: examining
the role of the International Finance Corporation in the Emergence of the Equator Principles, in
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
51 (Frank Biermann et al. eds., 2009); see also Susan Park, Socialization, the World Bank
30
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Recommendations on anti-money laundering by the Financial Action
Task Force.33
Although there are a lot of ways in which members of the FSB
engage in standard-setting, for purposes of the present paper, it
suffices to show that none of the standard-setting bodies strictu sensu
possess international legal personality.34 This explains why those
bodies are depicted as a different class of members than states’ national
regulatory agencies and international financial organizations, which do
possess an international legal personality within the FSB Charter.35
Likewise, it explains why they all work with the BIS’s assistance in

Group and global environmental governance, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 91 (Frank Biermann et al. eds., 2009)
(appraising the International Financial Corporation’s proneness to incorporate
environmental norms into its work and contrasting it with the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency’s reticence, also part of the World Bank; particularly
because the former has been opened to environmental networks that have socialized
the institution, thereby diffusing environmental norms through the International
Financial Corporation’s work, whilst the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
has resisted this effect).
33 See, e.g., Nicholas Turner, The Financial Action Task Force: International
Regulatory Convergence Through Soft Law, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 547, 559 (2014) (“The
FATF demonstrates that under the right conditions, it is possible to achieve
substantial, albeit imperfect, legal and regulatory coordination across the globe.”).
34 See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, Monetary & financial
stability - Overview, (last visited Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.bis.org/stability.htm (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision Charter, §3 (“The BCBS does not possess any
formal supranational authority. Its decisions do not have legal force. Rather, the
BCBS relies on its members’ commitments . . . to achieve its mandate.”)); BANK FOR
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, Committee on the Global Financial System: mandate, id.
(“The Committee . . . is a central bank forum”); BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMENTS, Charter of the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures,
id. at §3 (“CPMI does not possess any formal supranational authority”);
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE SUPERVISORS, (last visited May 1,
2016),
http://iaisweb.org/index.cfm?event=showHomePage&persistId=2F9C2180155D8
9A4065E749C0A3A37F0; INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD,
(last visited May 1, 2016), http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/Pages/IFRS-Foundationand-IASB.aspx; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS,
About
Iosco,
(last
visited
May
1,
2016),
https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=about_iosco.
35 See Charter of the Financial Stability Board, supra note 5, art. 5(1).
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terms of venue, infrastructure, and resources.36 Finally, this premise
also illustrates why states use this approach: because they are a form of
IIGO, lacking a binding effect in their decisions.37
2.

Supervision and Coordination

This level of the international financial legal regime is shared
mainly between the FSB and the IMF.38 Whereas the former is
concerned with macro-stability, the latter has been said to be
concerned with the micro-stability of avoiding risky behavior by banks
and other financial institutions.39 However, considering that the IMF
participates within the FSB and the latter’s mandate in coordinating all
financial entities, it can be said that the FSB holds the coordination

36 See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, Monetary & financial
stability – Overview, supra note 34 (describing the kind of assistance rendered by the
BIS); see also C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 13, 75 (2d ed., 2005) (analyzing how the dual
personality of the BIS as a legal person in both international and Swiss law does not
affect its character as an international organization); see also ROLAND PORTMANN,
LEGAL PERSONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 228–32 (2010) (analyzing the BIS
litigation of Reineccius et al. v. Bank for International Settlement as a form of “actor
conception”—attaching legal consequences to an international actor without
justifying them—whereby a panel of arbitrators recognized the international legal
personality of the Bank and analyzed certain legal consequences deriving therefrom,
such as the applicability of the expropriation and compensation rules of international
law towards its actions vis-à-vis private investors).
37 But see Gregory Shaffer & Mark Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives,
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. LAW REV. 706, 765–
67 (2010) (arguing that many of the standards produced by standard-setting
organizations within the international financial legal world have been hailed for being
effective because the existing treaties and soft law instruments created acted
complimentarily, on account of the consensus generated by the powerful states that
participated actively in all of the standard-setting forums explained above: the
European Union and the United States).
38 But see Gary Hufbauer, Rules of the International Trade, Investment, and
Financial Systems: What they Deliver, how they Differ, the way Forward, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L.
833, 839 (2014) (citing Rosa M Lastra, ‘Do we need a World Financial Organization’,
Special Conference in Honor of Professor John Jackson and the Institute of
International Economic Law, Georgetown Law Center, 16 November 2012) (arguing
that the World Trade Organization also performs this role in the liberalization of
financial trade, and that the BIS and other standard-setting bodies share the FSB’s
role at the micro-stability level).
39 Id.

314

2017

Soto Crespo

5:2

role of all standard-setting and supervisory functions within the
international financial architecture:
The [FSB] is established to coordinate at the
international level the work of national financial
authorities and international standard setting bodies
(SSBs) in order to develop and promote the
implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory
and other financial sector policies. In collaboration
with the international financial institutions, the FSB . .
. address[es] vulnerabilities affecting financial systems
in the interest of global financial stability.40
Regarding the IMF’s supervisory functions, it is important to
note that its supervisory function was triggered by the abandonment
of the par-value regime in the 1970s.41 Consequently, the IMF went
from being an international monetary institution with a limited
mandate on exchange rate stability and convertibility to a financial one
with a much narrower mandate, redefining its three main functions:
surveillance, conditional financial support, and technical assistance. 42
This has led the IMF to address issues ranging from payment systems,
to financial reform, banking and other capital markets.43 Contrary to
the FSB and other actors, the IMF has been heavily criticized for its
stance on development, particularly through its function as the lender
of last resort for states in addition to the conditions typically imposed, 44
which allegedly straightjackets developing countries to follow a set of
economic policies that may not be the best for their development. It
also has been denounced for neglecting environmental and

Charter of the Financial Stability Board, supra note 5, art. 1; see also
Wouters & Odermatt, supra note 10, at 75 (“the FSB was not established to
harmonize rules or to impose international regulation, but rather to coordinate other
important actors involved in maintaining financial stability.”).
41 Rosa Lastra, The International Monetary Fund in Historical Perspective, 3 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 507, 514 (2000).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 521–23 (“[Since the Mexican and Asian crisis in the mid-1990s,]
the IMF appear[ed] to . . . emerg[e] as a de facto international lender of last resort”
through its financial support to developing economies in stress.”).
40
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stakeholders’ interests, such as human rights, 45 that seem to constrain
basic sovereign regulatory spaces.46 Even compared to other
international financial institutions, the IMF has not been viewed as
receptive towards civil society and developing countries interests and
demands,47 contrary to the World Bank that created the Inspection
Panel for that purpose,48 for example. Be that as it may, today, the IMF
45 See, e.g., David Enríquez, El Derecho Internacional Económico. Apuntes para
una Crítica Contemporánea, 6 ANUARIO MEXICANO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL
[Mexican Yearbook of International Law] 251 (2006) (advocating for an
interdisciplinary approach towards international economic legal issues that considers
stakeholders’ interests, including human rights and environmental concerns); see also
David Enríquez, Batallas en el Sistema Financiero Internacional. Críticas y Réplicas
Contemporáneas en torno al Fondo Monetario Internacional y al Banco Mundial, 11 BOLETÍN
MEXICANO DE DERECHO COMPARADO [BMDC] 467, 499–502 (2007) (arguing that
states parties to loan agreements with the IMF and the World Bank, as well as those
institutions, have an obligation to respect human rights).
46 See, e.g., ANTHONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 258–69 (2004) (arguing that the World Bank and
the IMF, through the promotion of “good governance” in their conditional loans—
a recipe for making governments accountable, transparent and democratic, which in
turn links human rights and development—reproduce colonial aspects of
international law by imposing upon Third World countries structural adjustment
programs that reshape their economic, political and financial systems, and that are
driven by the economic considerations of richer states, wherein the countries
regulated cannot participate in their elaboration).
47 See Enríquez, Batallas en el Sistema Financiero Internacional. Críticas y Réplicas
Contemporáneas en torno al Fondo Monetario Internacional y al Banco Mundial, supra note 45,
at 523–25 (contrasting the IMF’s and the World Bank’s receptiveness to civil society’s
criticisms and democratic deficits: whereas the IMF’s openness has been limited to
its co-partnership role in combating poverty and debt relief with the World Bank
because economic concerns—and the need to tighten orthodox economic policies—
have prevailed over other interests in order to secure the repayment of its loans, the
latter has been more receptive due to more criticism by civil society and because its
infrastructure financing projects directly concern social and environmental problems;
for instance, the World Bank has permitted civil society participation and has
changed its policies through the creation of the Inspection Panel).
48 Alix Gowlland-Gualtieri, The Environmental Accountability of the World Bank
to Non-State Actors: Insights from the Inspection Panel, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 333 (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2009) (a positive outcome of the
World Bank’s Inspection Panel is its inclusion of environmental norms into its
procedures, thereby making states and the World Bank itself accountable through a
soft-law and flexible procedure for their loan activities vis-à-vis certain non-state
actors); see also Ellen Hey, The World Bank Inspection Panel and the Development of
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF TULLIO TREVES 727 (Nerina
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is one of the oldest actors in the field and the fact is that the IMF has
acquired a key place in the new financial architecture through its
surveillance powers, mainly.
Given the participation of the IMF in the FSB, and the
coordination of the latter in the international legal arena, both
institutions have cooperated very strongly to conduct Early Warning
Exercises for the analysis of systemic risk at the international level.49
3.

Enforcement and Sanctioning

The picture would not be complete without the governmental
actors that behold the monopoly of the enforcement and sanctioning
of financial institutions’ and banks’ deviations from the standards
created and consented to by the FSB and member institutions: the
national financial regulators. According to Gary Hufbauer, their
power, and thus the absence of an international or external examining
and disciplining scheme, can be attributed to two main reasons: First,
prescriptive rules in international finance are much more probabilistic
than trade or investment—in both of which regimes, dispute
adjudication has been delegated to international bodies—and thus
national regulators prefer to do so themselves because they have more
information about their national financial markets; and second,
because national financial regulators are not willing to cede their power
to an international body—contrary to what trade and investment
bureaucrats did—and their regulated financial entities prefer these
domestic, national bodies over foreign international regulators.50
This second reason could explain, in turn, the use of soft law
norms for the other two levels: since the standard-setting agencies’
regulations are not legally binding, and therefore cannot be imposed
upon states or financial institutions and banks, it seems reasonable that
Boschiero et al. eds., 2013) (appraising the World Bank Inspection Panel’s role in
promoting an administrative form of accountability wherein private parties’ access is
provided without the need of their home state, thereby departing from the classic
rules of international law).
49 See Charter of the Financial Stability Board, supra note 5, art. 2(h); see also
Wouters & Odermatt, supra note 10, at 70-74 (arguing that since the IMF and World
Bank are members of the FSB, they cooperate with it more than with the World
Trade Organization, who is not a FSB member).
50 Hufbauer, supra note 38, at 842.
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the supervisory and coordinating entities would also apply soft-law. By
doing so, they would have coordinating and supervisory functions
through a more-narrow mandate, leaving the sanctioning of deviations
to states once they voluntarily decide to implement the standards
consented to. This analysis is well-explained in the words of Rosa
Lastra:
The development of international financial law has
been a slow and patchy phenomenon because of three
reasons: (i) the lack of a clear legal mandate; (ii) a
reactive rather than a proactive character;51 and (iii) the
vested interests national governments have in the
supervision and regulation of their financial sectors. 52
Accordingly, (i) the absence of legally binding norms is
explained by the use of soft-law standards, which in turn helps fathom
the (ii) reactive character of the norms and the limited supervisory and
coordinating role that the IMF and the FSB have. Since they cannot
impose rules on states, reactive standards seem more suitable to be
implemented ex post financial crises; at a time in which consensus on
how to regulate the flaws for counteracting a crisis has emerged—as
well as the (iii) lack of delegation of adjudicative and sanctioning
functions for an international body.
III. THE FSB EXPLAINED
A. Path Dependency
Why would states seek recourse to an international
organization? Traditionally, through institutionalization, not only can
This aspect has been considered fundamental in explaining the reason
why the trade regime has scored better in its objective of liberalizing trade than the
financial regime has done to stabilize markets—although international financial
institutions have also promoted liberalization, whenever it enters into conflict with
stabilization, the latter will always prevail—particularly because GATT/WTO has
worked prospectively, whereas the IMF does so at the moment the crash occurs and
with “little power to compel appropriate macroeconomic policies and financial
practices”. Gary Hufbauer & Erika Wada, Can Financiers Learn from Traders?, 2 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 567, 569-73 (1999).
52 Lastra, supra note 4, at 796.
51
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states act collectively and overcome their coordination problems,53 but
they could also accomplish legally binding decisions derived from the
treaty that created the organization.54 Furthermore, through an
international organization they can also legitimize the whole rulemaking process, as they would have to be constrained by the rules of
international law that protect non-powerful states through the
sovereign equality principle.
However, the need for consensus, and even the ability to
afford the same voting rights to all states has changed, depending on
the international organization concerned. 55 And even in the aegis of
the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions did not foresee
equality of voting rights. Nevertheless, the legitimacy that being an
international organization accrues might differentiate them with other
informal venues, such as IIGOs. Dani Rodrik depicts this idea by
contrasting the contemporary globalization world with the
“multilateralism” that existed during the Bretton Woods system:
Multilateralism meant that rule enforcement and belief
systems would work henceforth through international
institutions—the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT)—rather than through naked power
politics or imperial rule. Even though the influence of
the United States was undeniable, multilateralism
endowed these institutions with a certain degree of
legitimacy independent of the American power that
backed them up.56

Wouters & Odermatt, supra note 10, at 52 (“While the whole
international community has an interest in a ‘stable’ global financial system,
individual states will continue to take steps that are in their own (short-term)
interests, even if they remain precarious for the system as a whole. It is for this reason
that states have looked to international institutions to help overcome this collective
action problem and promote greater global cooperation.”).
54 ÁLVAREZ, supra note 15, at 395.
55 Id.
56 DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY AND
THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 70 (2011); see also Robert Howse, From
Politics to Technocracy—and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM.
J. INT’L L. 94, 94–95 (2002) (arguing that Bretton Woods was “concerned with the
53
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Chris Brummer explains how the current globalization system
not only meant an erosion of the dominance of the United States in
the world arena—and thus of a more diffused world in terms of power,
where “[e]merging markets have generally been the big winners”—but
also that the current multi-polarity has made multilateralism more
difficult and costly, thereby “giving way to new, innovative modes of
cooperation” called minilateralism: strategic alliances with smaller
groups; states turning away from treaties towards more soft law; and
financial engineering in states’ dealings.57 Although effective, this new
economic statecraft raises issues of fairness and democratic legitimacy,
given its exclusive character and “sidestep[ping] [of] some of the
multilateral values of universality and due process”.58
Accordingly, Georges Baur argues that whereas international
organizations respected the equality of states and other rules of
international law through inclusiveness and consent, informal
international task groups do not, such as the FSF, because they impose
standards and sanctions that are created by the task group’s memberstates against other non-member states, with the purpose of advancing
the former group’s economic and political interests at the cost of the
latters’.59
Nevertheless, this is the current paradigm of global finance
today, and we cannot simply return to the Bretton Woods system.60
On the contrary, the financial globalization created by deregulation,
interdependency of different states’ trade and other economic policies—i.e.,
managing or constraining the external costs that states impose on other states by
virtue of their policies.”) (emphasis in original).
57 CHRIS BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM: HOW TRADE ALLIANCES, SOFT
LAW, AND FINANCIAL ENGINEERING ARE REDEFINING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT
16–19 (2014).
58 Id. at 20.
59 Georges Baur, Will New Developments in Global Economic and Financial Policy
Erode International Law and the Sovereignty of States? – The Example of Liechtenstein, in
PROMOTING JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LIBER AMICORUM LUCIUS CAFLISCH 1017 (Marcelo G.
Kohen ed., 2007).
60 See Rolf Weber & Douglas Arner, Toward a New Design for International
Financial Regulation, 29 J. INT’L L. 391, 438 (“The Bretton Woods system was designed
to support global trade but not global finance. As a result, we cannot simply return
to the old system but must look towards the requirements of today’s reality.”).
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technology and financial innovation has changed the regulatory space
of the field.61 The reality is that states have decided to use the
minilateralism strategy of soft law in international finance, at least since
the Group of Ten (G-10)—composed of the most industrialized
nations of that time62—established the BCBS in the aftermath of the
failure of the German Herstatt Bank and the American Franklin
National Bank of New York in 1974.63 In the words of Pierre-Hugues
Verdier:
When the fixed rate system collapsed in the 1970s,
national regulators faced numerous new cross-border
challenges. With no international framework to
address them and no authority to create formal
institutions or binding agreements, they instead created
informal networks and non-binding standards.64
Thereafter, cooperative informal initiatives in other financial
sectors were created and their roles exacerbated in the demise of
Bretton Woods system, which had a very limited role for international
private finance where international capital mobility was not the norm, 65
and thus, “no provision was made for regulating private finance.”66
Contrary to arguments that espouse the rationality of using soft law in
international financial law as the ones depicted in the section above,
the use of IIGOs and soft law norms in the international financial legal
arena can be explained through what Verdier calls a historical path
dependency: 67
In the absence of an international institution, national
regulators took the initiative, but they faced several
constraints. Their options were limited by their
CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM:
RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 10 (2015).
62 See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, G10, (last visited Mar.
1, 2016), https://www.bis.org/list/g10publications/index.htm.
63 BRUMMER, supra note 57, at 99–100.
64 Verdier, supra note 11, at 1408.
65 Id. at 1411–12.
66 Id. at 1416.
67 Id. at 1427; but cf. BRUMMER, supra note 61, at 108–09 (analyzing an
“institutional path dependency” in the structure and composition of the
organizations).
61
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domestic statutory authority, which they could not
easily change. They did not have a clear mandate to act
internationally, much less bind their state to legal
obligations. They did not have a forum in which to
meet; often they did not even know each other. In that
context, regulators proceeded incrementally by
creating informal networks to exchange ideas,
coordinate their actions, and agree on nonbinding
standards.
B. Regulatory Zealousness
Verdier’s explanation of a historical path dependency
constraining national financial regulators’ options is persuasive on the
central role that they have had in the field ever since the 1970s. Under
this account, national financial regulators have had a zealous attitude
towards “preserv[ing] their domestic autonomy, flexibility and
discretion” vis-à-vis the national legislatures that create them and other
international actors, including their own peers from other countries. 68
Accordingly, national financial regulators have tried to look for legal
tools that neither diminish their power nor grant additional ones to
other bodies that could supervise or check their work. “[F]rom the
regulators’ private perspective, soft law and TRNs [transnational
regulatory networks or IIGOs] reconcile their wish to achieve shortterm regulatory objectives with their desire to preserve their domestic
authority and flexibility.”69
This zealousness can be also seen in bilateral investment
treaties and free trade agreements, where although historically both
instruments “have covered financial services for decades, . . . they all
tread gingerly on national regulators’ turf, separating financial
liberalization from other investment and service commitments”. 70 For

68 Verdier, supra note 11, at 1430. Verdier also contends that powerful
states—such as the United States and the European Union—and private firms are
the other two veto players that shape the agenda and outcome, along with national
financial regulators, of the international financial legal regime.
69 Id. at 1457.
70 Anna Gelpern, Financial Services, in ASSESSING THE TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP: VOLUME 1: MARKET ACCESS AND SECTORAL ISSUES 91 (Peterson
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instance, “[n]either NAFTA nor other US bilateral trade and
investment agreements curbed the unlimited discretion of financial
regulators, so in this respect the TPP71 continues a well-established
tradition.”72
Likewise, it can even be fathomed in certain domestic contexts.
For example, the use of informal venues that coordinate already
existing institutions was pursued by the United States with the creation
of the Financial Stability Oversight Council through the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act73 as an umbrella
body that tightened cooperation among the existing federal banking
and financial regulatory agencies.74 Therefore, there seems to be
Institute for International Economics, 2016) (last visited May 10, 2016),
https://piie.com/system/files/documents/piieb16-1.pdf.
71 Trans-Pacific Partnership.
72 Jennifer Hillman, Dispute Settlement Mechanism, in ASSESSING THE TRANSPACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, VOLUME 2: INNOVATIONS IN TRADING RULES 101, 110
(Jeffrey Schott & Catleen Cimino-Isaacs eds., 2016), (last visited May 10, 2016),
https://piie.com/system/files/documents/piieb16-4.pdf; see also Gelpern, supra note
70, at 96 (“The TPP’s novel treatment of exceptions in dispute resolution evokes a
broader pattern of deference to financial regulatory authorities and financial
experts. . . . The TPP’s innovation is in the dispute settlement procedure that would
apply to determine whether a measure is, in fact, there “for prudential reasons” or
otherwise exempt. . . . In all, financial firms under the TPP are more limited than
firms in other sectors in the relief they can get from taking their grievances to ISDS
[investment system of dispute settlement].”).
73 DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT; FINANCIAL STABILITY ACT OF 2010; ENHANCING
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS ACT OF 2010;
PRIVATE FUND INVESTMENT ADVISERS REGISTRATION ACT OF 2010;
FEDERAL INSURANCE OFFICE ACT OF 2010; NONADMITTED AND
REINSURANCE REFORM ACT OF 2010; BANK AND SAVINGS
ASSOCIATION HOLDING COMPANY AND DEPOSITORY INSTITUTION
REGULATORY IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 2010; WALL STREET
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2010; PAYMENT,
CLEARING, AND SETTLEMENT SUPERVISION ACT OF 2010; INVESTOR
PROTECTION AND SECURITIES REFORM ACT OF 2010.; CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION ACT OF 2010; IMPROVING ACCESS TO
MAINSTREAM FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ACT OF 2010; MORTGAGE
REFORM AND ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING ACT; EXPAND AND
PRESERVE HOME OWNERSHIP THROUGH COUNSELING ACT, 111 P.L.
203, Part 1 of 3, 124 Stat. 1377.
74 Robert Thompson, Financial Regulation’s Architecture within International
Economic Law, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 807, 811 (2014).

323

2017

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

5:2

continuity from the domestic unto the international level of creating
umbrella-coordinating forums for existing agencies, instead of creating
new institutions.75 Seen in another light: the zealousness of financial
national regulators to retain their power in the financial arena also
affects the institutional building of domestic institutions.
National regulators are the most important actors in the
financial legal arena: not only do they behold the gates to the
implementation of the rules, but they also participate in their creation
and supervision. In other words, this is a “departure from traditional
public international models of diplomacy, where political elites and
heads of state participate. It injects technocratic skill at the highest level
of the rulemaking process.”76 Even though they are ultimately
constrained by national regulators from other countries, on the one
hand, and their own domestic political organs, on the other,77 it is clear
that they inform the shape of the whole process, and that without some
external supervision, the regulators will not “internalize the costs of
their regulatory decision making”, thereby reducing the compliance
pull of international financial law.78 Accordingly, instead of retaining
the current voluntary monitoring and surveillance programs, calls for
third party enforcement of prudential standards have been raised.79
C. Diversity
As explained above, globalization and the subsequent
liberalization of finance saw drawbacks in capital movement controls
and financial crises, which for the most part occurred in the developing
75 See Id. at 808 (implying a continuity by arguing that the response to the
2007–2008 crisis began with national responses, such as Dodd-Frank in 2010, but
then saw the creation of the FSB “to play a coordinating role that seeks to meld the
technocratic expertise in various international standard setting and supervision
bodies and the political legitimacy from heads of government”); see also Robert
Howse, The end of the globalization debate: continued, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
AND NATIONAL AUTONOMY 7, 18 (Meredith Kolsky & Susy Frankel eds., 2010)
(arguing that state responses to the financial crisis have not been devised to stop the
liberalization of capital movements, but rather to strengthen its regulation at the
global level through the FSB).
76 Brummer, supra note 26, at 274.
77 Id. at 274–75.
78 Id. at 326–27.
79 Arts & Kerwer, supra note 21, at 162.
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world.80 A tipping point occurred in the 1997 Asian financial crisis,
which led to the creation of the first overarching forum for financial
stability: the FSF.81
However, it was not until the 2008 financial crisis that a
coordinated architecture for the whole international financial regime
was created. The crisis highlighted the need to integrate the
international financial legal regime, on one hand, and that developed
nations could also be prone to catastrophic financial failures, on the
other; all of which led to the displacement of the G-7 by the G-20 and
the creation of the FSB.82
Through its more inclusive nature and stronger powers, the G20 and FSB’s combined efforts’ have enhanced each other’s legitimacy:
by “teaming technocratic pragmatism with democratic norms”. 83
Although there is a long way to go and the G-20 is still not universal,
the transition from only like-minded countries in the G-7 to a more
diverse membership in the G-20—in both the geographical and
development level in terms of economic importance—is to be hailed. 84

See, e.g., Stephen Zamora, Exchange Control in Mexico: Case Study in the
Application of IMF Rules, 7 HOUS. J. INT’L. L. 103 (1984-1985) (analyzing the
compatibility of Mexican exchange control measures after the 1982-83 crisis with
Article VIII of the IMF Agreement); see also Stephen Zamora, Recognition of Foreign
Exchange Controls in International Creditors’ Rights Cases: The State of the Art, 21 INT’L L.
1055 (1987) (analyzing different legal doctrines by which an American court could
give effect or recognition to the exchange controls of foreign governments in the
United States, and concluding that the cases demonstrate some limited recognition
of foreign governments’ acts on that regard, but noting that none of those cases used
article VIII of the IMF Agreement).
81 BRUMMER, supra note 57, at 102.
82 Id. at 107.
83 Id. at 193–98.
84 But cf. Weber & Arner, supra note 60, at 453 (“a goal of the international
financial architecture should focus on the increased integration of developing,
emerging, and transition economies into the international financial system. However,
this integration is not without its dangers and must be based on coherent sequencing
of liberalization preceded as a necessary first stage by the development of an
effectively functioning financial system in each country.”).
80
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IV. CONCLUSION
In regards to the recent international financial architecture
created after the financial crisis, Robert Thompson summarizes its
characteristics in the following manner: Focus on macro-prudential
regulation through FSB’s coordination; prudential regulatory
competition between states that puts them in a parallel position, as they
all want to regulate banks and financial institutions, thereby suggesting
that harmonization of national laws through soft law is a better strategy
than an inter-state dispute settlement approach; need for technocratic
experts at the national regulatory agencies; lack of enforcement,
accountability and transparency; and a possible de-legitimization
because of exclusivity in membership to the G-20.85 This sums up
many of the challenges that the system must address.
Although certain reforms have been advanced to harden the
regime, path dependency leads to the belief that states will only regulate
this area of the international legal system through soft law. Flexibility
is preferred over strict long-term rules that could forestall the need to
apply effective action in response to a crisis, as has occurred in the
past. Likewise, apprehension by national financial regulators of the
adjudicative, enforcement, and sanctioning procedures seems to
suggest an aversion by states of delegating those functions to an
international body, and thus losing their power. Probably for this
reason the FSB will remain an IIGO and not become an international
organization: the objective underlying its creation was to become an
umbrella-coordinating venue for all existing standard-setting bodies,
national regulators, and international financial institutions; not to
encroach the existing institutions’ mandate by imposing another layer
of institutionalization. G-20 member states explicitly denied granting
an international legal personality to the FSB; 86 they only wanted
coordination.87

Thompson, supra note 74, at 818–22.
See Charter of the Financial Stability Board, supra note 5, art. 24.
87 See Wouters & Odermatt, supra note 10, at 55-56 (highlighting the fact
that G-20 members have adapted and modified continuously the mandate of the
FSB, which would be difficult to accomplish had it been created through a treaty
charter).
85
86

326

2017

Soto Crespo

5:2

As of late, powerful countries have regulated this area of the
law and probably won’t cede that law-making power, particularly the
states integrating the G-20. Further, it is not necessarily certain that
rule-making in the international financial legal regime should be
“democratized” and subjected to other state participants outside of the
current G-20 members, as the safety and soundness of the
international financial system relies purely upon technocratic expertise
and legitimacy, not its democratic aspect. Hence, current G-20
member states may be more effective in addressing these issues than
other developing nations who struggle with structural problems, such
as lack of accountability and transparency in resolving crises.88
Nonetheless, the transition from the primordial role in the
international financial space that the G-7 had to the current one held
by the G-20 can be viewed as a positive step towards a more inclusive
regime that, eventually, could lead to even more diversity, and perhaps
even universality.

See, e.g., Sigmond, supra note 3 (contrasting the transparency and
accountability in the American bailout of banks and financial institutions in the
Obama administration with the opacity and corruption in the secretive bailout
process of the 1995 Mexican crisis by then President Zedillo’s administration; at a
time when Mexico was not considered that relevant, and thus was not part of the G20’s predecessor—the Group of Seven); but cf. Stephen Haber & Aldo Musacchio
These Are the Good Old Days: Foreign Entry and the Mexican Banking System, NATIONAL
BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 3 (2013), (last visited May 10, 2016),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18713.pdf (contending that Mexico’s 1997
liberalization of financial ownership to foreigners, which led to the ownership of
more than half of the financial and banking industries to foreign capital very rapidly,
actually helped increased the supply of credit, further the stability of the system, and
not raise the credit cost).
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